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Abstract 
We analyse both theoretically and empirically, the factors that influence the 
amount of humanitarian aid received by countries which are struck by natural 
disasters, particularly distinguishing between immediate disaster relief and long 
term humanitarian aid. The theoretical model is able to make predictions as well as 
explain some of the peculiarities in the empirical results. We show that both short 
and long term humanitarian aid increases with number of people killed, financial 
loss and level of corruption, while GDP per capita had no effect. More populated 
countries receive more humanitarian aid. Earthquake, tsunami and drought attract 
more aid.  
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1. Introduction 
During the last few decades, there has been a heightened awareness of natural 
disasters around the world. Dilley et al. (2005) estimated that 3.4 billion people - 
which constitute more than half of the world's population - live in areas which are 
exposed to at least one significant hazard. In 2012 alone, natural disasters around 
the world resulted in nearly 107 million people being affected, 11548 people being 
killed and a financial loss of USD 156 million.
1
 According to the annual report of the 
United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), 
humanitarian aid in 2012 was a massive USD 17.9 billion. The level of aid flow and 
the severity with which natural disasters affect people and economies have 
prompted researchers to study this issue from several angles. 
Our paper contributes to the strand of literature which studies the determinants of 
disaster relief/ humanitarian aid (both terms are used interchangeably throughout 
this paper). This paper consists of a theoretical model as well as an empirical 
investigation which analyses how the various factors affect the amount of 
humanitarian aid disbursed by the donors, making a distinction between short term 
and long term aid. The determinants of these two types of aid could be different. 
To the best of our knowledge, there is no study which makes a distinction between 
immediate disaster relief and long term humanitarian aid, either in a theoretical 
framework or in an empirical analysis.
2
 The theoretical model presented in our 
paper makes some predictions and provide an understanding on how the aid 
disbursement works. The results of the model help explain the outcomes of the 
empirical investigation including some apparent puzzles. 
In this paper, immediate disaster relief is the assistance given to victims of natural 
disasters who require basic humanitarian assistance such as medical care, food, 
shelter etc. to help them survive in the aftermath of the disaster and alleviate their 
suffering; whereas long term humanitarian aid is the assistance given towards 
disaster reconstruction and rehabilitation to help rebuild the victims' personal 
assets, the communities' infrastructure or public services such as hospitals, schools, 
roads, bridges, shops, fishing boats, farms and personal financial losses that have 
been affected by the natural disasters. 
In the empirical literature on disaster relief, there are few papers that study the 
determinants of humanitarian aid. Stromberg (2007) investigates the factors which 
determine the binary decision of the donors whether or not humanitarian aid is 
given (unlike our analysis where the dependent variable is the amount of 
humanitarian aid), using data on natural disasters that occurred between 1980-
2004. He finds that colonial history, common language, trade relations and close 
proximity will increase the probability of receiving disaster relief. 
                                                           
1
 http://www.emdat.be/advanced_search/index.html 
2
 Some papers discuss the long-term and short-term effects of natural disasters (Cavallo and Noy (2009), 
Raddatz (2007), Noy (2009), Loayza (2009), Raddatz (2009), Jaramillo (2009)). 
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Olsen et al. (2003) investigate the determinants of humanitarian aid based on a 
qualitative and quantitative analysis. They find that there are three key factors that 
determine the amount of humanitarian aid disbursed by the donors, namely the 
intensity of media coverage; the degree of donors' political and security interest 
and the strength of humanitarian NGOs and international organisations in the 
affected country. Fink and Redaelli (2009) show that bilateral humanitarian aid is 
determined by political and strategic interests of donors, captured by the close 
proximity between the donor and the recipient countries; the availability of crude 
oil in the recipient countries and whether the recipient countries are former 
colonies. Raschky and Schwindt (2009) also show that donors are influenced by 
strategic interests such as availability of oil and trade relationships. Becerra et al 
(2012) find that the severity of disasters influences the amount of aid received, as 
are the country size and foreign reserves, but they find no evidence of strategic 
behaviour.  
Existing research has focused on bilateral aid, analysing the factors that have led a 
specific country to give aid to another specific country such as colonial past, 
language, distance, political strategy, trade opportunities etc. We are focusing on 
the total amount of disaster relief that is received in response to different disasters 
and seeing how these relate to not only some features of the country -- population, 
GDP per capita, measures of corruption, but more importantly to features of the 
disaster itself - its nature, scale and severity. Moreover, we also analyse separately 
the factors affecting immediate relief and long term aid. Does the international 
community as a whole end up giving more aid to those who are in greater need as 
a result of greater damage? 
To analyse the determinants of humanitarian aid, a panel data analysis is 
performed, based on data on countries affected by natural disasters over the 
period of 1995 - 2008 and the humanitarian aid - both immediate relief and long 
term - that was received. Such an empirical investigation is possible because of two 
datasets that are available. The first is the Project-Level Aid (PLAID) dataset 
developed by William and Mary University and Brigham Young University. This 
dataset provides a detailed coding which gives information about when and why 
the aid was given, enabling us to select data only on disaster relief disbursed in 
response to natural disasters, as well as distinguish between short-term and long-
term disaster reliefs. The second dataset, EM-DAT, is maintained by the Centre for 
Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED) at the University of Louvain, 
which gives information about the occurrences of all the natural disasters and the 
damages caused by them such as the amount of financial loss, the number of 
people killed and the number of people affected by the natural disasters. 
In our analysis, we consider three natural disaster-specific characteristics which can 
affect the amount of aid it attracts: its nature, scale and severity. The nature of the 
disaster is related to whether it is a flood, earthquake, epidemic etc. The scale of 
disaster is the number of people affected. People can be affected in several ways: 
Geethanjali SELVARETNAM, Kannika THAMPANISHVONG & David ULPH 
 
 
Page |4                                                                            EJBE 2014, 7 (14) 
loss inflicted on a person through injury, illness and potential or even actual loss of 
life; while loss of property refers to damage to homes and/or means of livelihood 
(e.g. boats). Some victims require immediate relief to save their lives while others 
require long term aid to rebuild their lives. Severity can be thought of as being 
measured in terms of the extent of loss to the person and property, so it could be 
reflected in factors such as the number of people killed and amount of financial 
loss. 
The theoretical model we put forward is simple but quite powerful and capable of 
predicting our empirical findings. Once a country is hit by a natural disaster, the aid 
agency has to decide the type of humanitarian aid to be given to the affected 
country. The model also distinguishes between short term and long term 
humanitarian aid. In the model, we allow immediate relief to reduce the probability 
of death of those who face the risk of dying as a result of the natural disaster while 
the long term aid restores part of the financial loss that is suffered by the victims. 
 The theoretical model attempts to investigate first of all, whether there are any 
underlying determinants relating to both the scale and severity of the disaster and 
to the socioeconomic features of the country that help explain the different 
amount of short-term and long-term humanitarian aid that are given to different 
countries. Although we recognise that the amount of each type of aid given could 
well vary depending on the nature of the disaster (we include this in our empirical 
analysis), we will suppress any explicit reference to the nature of the disaster. First 
the theoretical framework investigates the effects of the scale and severity of the 
disaster. Then it goes on to relate both types of aid to the variables that we 
observe, i.e. number of people affected, number of deaths, the amount of financial 
loss, GDP per capita and the level of corruption. 
Our empirical results show that both long term and short term humanitarian aid 
increase with the number of people killed and the amount of financial loss. Those 
who are dead cannot benefit from the increase in aid. Financial loss should attract 
long term aid to restore the damaged property, but why should it attract short 
term aid? The theoretical model shows that these outcomes are indeed possible. 
The reason is that financial losses signal the severity of the disaster and thus attract 
more short term aid as well. Long term aid also significantly increases with the total 
number of people affected according to the empirical analysis. The GDP per capita 
was found to be not statistically significant in determining either type of 
humanitarian aid, while the theoretical model shows the effect to be ambiguous. 
This result indicates that the donors are not influenced by how wealthy the 
affected country is, when it comes to humanitarian aid.  
The level of corruption significantly increased both types of aid. Even though it is a 
surprising result, considering this is for humanitarian purposes, donors seem to 
care sufficiently about the victims that they increase the amount of aid in order to 
help them, even though much of it will be leaked. The theoretical model shows that 
if the donor is sufficiently inequality averse, and the level of corruption is not that 
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high, there would be an increase in humanitarian aid when the level of corruption 
increases. 
Empirical results show that countries with larger population receive significantly 
higher humanitarian aid, which reflect that donors should be more mindful of the 
needs of smaller countries. Disaster relief is significantly higher if the type of 
disaster that struck was earthquake, tsunami or drought, while it is lower if the 
country suffers extreme weather conditions. Long term aid is actually lower in 
response to a flood. Humanitarian aid in response to volcanos, avalanches, storm 
and wildfires is not significant. One of the contributions of this paper is to raise 
awareness to donors that the above mentioned disasters are not receiving as much 
aid compared with other types which cause damage of similar scale and severity. 
Our paper is also related to a few other strands of literature. Poorer countries 
suffer more because they are less prepared to face natural disasters and poor 
people suffer more because they cannot afford to relocate to less disaster-prone 
areas ( Kahn (2005), Toya and Skidmore (2006), Raddatz (2009), Stromberg (2007)). 
A few papers study the decision of donors whether to give cash or in-kind aid 
(Raschky and Schwindt (2009), Amegashie et al., (2007)). 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we present the 
theoretical framework. Section 3 is devoted for the empirical analysis, while section 
4 concludes. 
2. Theoretical Model 
There are  > 1 countries that are hit by a particular type of natural disaster. An 
aid agency has a humanitarian aid budget, , which has to be allocated to these 
different countries as both short-term and long-term aid. Consider a particular 
country . The average income of this country before the disaster struck is  > 0, 
which indicates the level of development of this country. The degree of corruption 
in this country is 	, where 0 < 	  < 1; thus for any given amount of humanitarian 
aid given as either short-term or long-term aid only a fraction (1 − 	) reaches the 
intended recipients. The two parameters,   and 	, capture the socioeconomic 
characteristics of this country. Now consider in turn the factors that might affect 
the amount of long-term and short-term aid to be given to each country. 
Long-Term Humanitarian Aid: Let  be the number of people who have survived 
the disaster but have suffered some financial loss. Long-term aid is needed for 
reconstruction and rehabilitation. The scale of the disaster in terms of the need for 
long-term aid is measured by . Each person suffers, on average, a financial loss 
of  =  where 0 ≤  < 1, so that they are left with an average income of (1 − )  after the disaster. The severity of the disaster in terms of the need for 
long-term aid is measured by . Therefore, the total financial loss in country  is 
    =  =  .                                                             (1) 
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This measure reflects both the scale and severity of the long-term humanitarian 
problem facing country . Let , where 0 ≤  ≤ 1 denote the fraction of an 
individual's financial loss that is restored through long-term humanitarian aid. The 
restriction that no more than the whole loss is restored reflects the fact that this is 
humanitarian rather than general development aid. The total welfare from the 
long-term aid given to country  is measured by 
   = [(1 −  + )],                                             (2) 
where () is an individual welfare function that reflects the agency's views about 
how individual well-being relates to consumption, and is assumed not to vary 
across countries. The welfare function is assumed to satisfy the usual conditions ′ > 0, " < 0. We make the relatively standard assumption that the aid agency's 
individual welfare belongs to the class for which ′() = "# , where $ ≥ 0 is a 
measure of the agency's inequality aversion. 
Taking into account the level of corruption in country , the total amount of long-
term humanitarian aid that would have to be given to country  by the aid agency 
to achieve the level of welfare, , is given by: 
   = &'()'(*'(+'(,"-') .                                                                                            (3) 
Short-Term Aid: Let  / be the number of people in need of short-term 
humanitarian aid and so potentially at risk of dying if they do not receive such 
assistance. This measures the scale of the disaster in terms of the need for short-
term humanitarian, and is fixed and independent of . Donors consider the long 
term needs of victims irrespective of whether they are also in need of short term 
aid and vice versa. 
Assume that a fraction  /, where 0 ≤  / ≤ 1, of these people will survive if, on 
average, each of them receives an amount ( /,  /) ≥ 0 where, as we will see, 0 ≤  / < 1 is a parameter that will measure the severity of the disaster that has 
struck country  in terms of the need for short-term aid. In other words, (. ) 
captures the cost of saving a victim requiring immediate relief. 
Assume that the generic form of the function (, ) satisfies the following 
conditions for all , where 0 ≤  < 1 and for all , where 0 <  ≤ 1 − : 
(i)   (0, ) = 0, which means if no aid is given then no one survives. 
(ii) )(, ) > 0, ))(, ) > 0; )(, ) → ∞ as  → 1 − . The marginal cost of 
increasing the survival rate is positive, increasing and tends to infinity as the 
fraction of those who survive tends to the limit set by the severity of the disaster; 
the fraction of people who survive will be bounded above by a factor that depends 
on the severity of the disaster. The more severe the disaster, the smaller the 
fraction that will survive. 
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(iii).  )(, ) > 0; *)(, ) > 0, which captures the fact that an increase in the 
severity of the disaster increases both the total and the marginal cost of any 
survival fraction. 
An example of a function that satisfies all these conditions is 
  (, ) = 23 451 − ),"*6"3 − 17,                                                                   (4)
  
where the parameters 9 > 0, : > 0. 
Notice that since 0 <  / ≤ 1 −  / it follows that the fraction of people who 
ultimately die as a result of the disaster, 1 −  /, is greater than  /, our measure of 
the severity of the disaster. Given this interpretation of the short term severity 
parameter,  /, it represents the fraction of the population at risk who cannot be 
saved because they are killed more or less outright. In this sense it provides a 
useful measure of the severity of the disaster. The number of people killed outright 
in country  is therefore 
    =  / /,                                                                                   (5) 
which reflects both the severity and scale of the short-term disaster. 
We assume that the perceived benefit to the aid agency of saving a life - i.e. 
increasing survival - is <( /), <′ > 0, which is independent of the scale and severity 
of the disaster as well as the affected country. This formulation reflects three key 
assumptions. First, we allow for the possibility that the value of saving a life may 
depend on the severity of the disaster, so the larger the number of people killed 
outright the greater is the imperative perceived by the agency to try to stop yet 
more people dying. Secondly, the value of saving a life is independent of  /, the 
fraction of lives saved. In particular there is no diminishing marginal benefit. This 
reflects the assumption that the aid agency believes that each life that can be 
saved is just as valuable as every other life that is saved. Finally, conditioning on the 
severity of the disaster, the value of saving a life does not depend on the country 
struck by disaster or the nature of the disaster, which reflect the assumption that 
the value of saving a life is the same across countries and independent of the 
nature of the disaster. We introduce a two-parameter class of function as a specific 
functional form for the aid agency's benefit of saving a life, given by equation (6), 
which satisfies the above conditions and will be useful in our analysis later: 
  <() = =>(1 − )"? ,                                                                                 (6) 
where = > 0, A ≥ 0, B ≥ 0 are constants. This formulation allows for the possibility 
that the severity of the disaster could affect the perceived benefit of saving a life in 
different ways. As we will see later, if A > 0, then disasters that are very mild will 
receive no short-term funding. On the other hand if B < 1 then disasters that are 
extremely severe will also receive no short-term aid - reflecting the perception that 
it is so difficult to save anyone else, that it is not worth spending resources by 
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attempting to do so. We realise that these are strong assumptions and draw 
attention to the fact that this specific functional form does allow <(. ) to be 
independent of the degree of severity when A =  B = 0. 
The total welfare from the short-term humanitarian aid given to country  is 
    / =  / /<( /)                                                                    (7) 
and, taking into account the effective aid that benefits the intended victims, the 
total amount of short-term humanitarian aid given by the agency to country  is 
    / = &'DEF)'D,*'DG(,"-')                                                                          (8) 
2.1. The Aid Agency's Decision Problem 
The aid agency's objective is to maximise the total welfare in equation (9), which is 
the summation of (2) and (7) which is ( /+). For each country, , it takes as 
given the socioeconomic characteristics of that country, ( , 	), and both the scale 
and severity of the short-term and long-term characteristics of the disaster that has 
struck that country -- ( /,  /) and (, ) respectively. The constraint faced by 
the aid agency given by (10) is that the total of aid given as the short term and long 
term aid should not exceed the aid budget of , which is the summation of (3) and 
(8). The choice variables are the proportion of victims to save and the proportion of 
financial loss to replace,  /, ,  = 1, . . . . 
IJKLMLNO /,  PQ / /= + [F1 −  + RS
T
U,                                                (9) 
N<WOX XY P Q / /= + [F1 −  + RS(1 − 	)
T
U, ≤                                    (10) 
    At an interior solution the first order conditions are given in (11) to (13): 
<( /) ≤ Z) 5[ /,  /6(1 − 	) ,     [ / ≥ 0;                                                                                (11) 
′[(1 −  +  )] ≤ Z(1 − 	) + ] , [ ≥ 0;                                        (12) ] ≥ 0,  ≤ 1,                                                                                                              (13) 
where ] is the Lagrange multiplier on the constraint [ ≤ 1 and each pair of 
inequalities holds with complementary slackness. Similar Lagrange multipliers are 
not needed for the short-term aid because of our assumption on the cost function ( /,  /) that [ / < 1 −  /. The Lagrange multiplier for constraint (10) is given by Z. 
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This paper aims to explain why, in a given allocation, some disasters get neither 
short term nor long term aid, and why, for those that do receive aid, some attract 
more short-term and/or long-term aid than others. In what follows, we treat Z as a 
constant and see how the amount of short-term and long-term aid given to each 
country is influenced by the socioeconomic factors and the scale and severity of the 
disaster. For notational simplicity, the sub-script,  for country is now dropped. 
Before proceeding to develop the cross-section implications of (11) and (12) for the 
determinants of aid there are two general points to note. The first point is that the 
optimal fractions [ /, [, and hence the amount of short-term and long-term aid 
received by each individual do not depend on the scale of the disaster in country  
but only on the severity of the disaster and the socioeconomic characteristics of the 
country, which include the GDP per capita and the scale of corruption. 
 Secondly we note that in reality, the donors do not directly observe the theoretical 
constructs of the model - the scale and severity of the short-term and long-term 
humanitarian disaster facing a country. Rather what can be observed are some 
related variables: the number of people killed, the number of people affected and 
the financial loss. These are related to the scale and severity of the short and long-
term aspects of natural disasters. Equation (1) tells us how financial loss is related. 
The total number of people affected by the disaster (defined as those suffering 
injury/illness, becoming homeless and losing their livelihood) in country  can be 
written as, 
^ = (1 −  /) / + .                                                                                             (14) 
Notice that it follows from (5) and (14) that the number of people killed would be, 
 =  / +  − ^ .                                                                                                     (15) 
However (1), (14) and (15) constitute just three equations in what are in principle 
four variables characterising the scale and severity of both the short-term and long-
term humanitarian disaster that have hit a country. It is reasonable to assume that 
typically, the severity of these two aspects of natural disasters is related. In fact we 
make a rather strong assumption that they are identical, i.e. that  = / and 
denote this common value by . We can rearrange (1), (14) and (15) to obtain 
functions for the scale and severity of the disaster as follows: 
 = ^ + 1 + T+                                                                                                                        (16) 
/ = ^ + 1 + T+                                                                                                                        (17) 
 = + + ^ +                                                                                                                             (18) 
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Notice that in order for the severity of the disaster to satisfy the condition that  ≤ 1 it must be that case that  ≤ ^   L. O. XℎJX  ≤ ,                                                                                                          (19) 
which states that the scale of the financial loss per person affected must be less 
than the average income. In what follows we assume that (19) always holds. 
Proposition 1 predicts how the scale and severity of the disaster (number of people 
needing long term aid, number of people needing short term aid and the extent of 
both types of losses captured by ) are affected by the variables that can be 
observed (total number of people who are affected, number of people who are 
killed outright, financial loss and average income). 
The number of people needing long term aid increases with the total number of 
people affected and financial loss, while it decreases with the number of people 
killed and average income. Number of people in need of short term aid increases 
with total number of people affected, number of people killed and average income, 
but goes down with financial loss. As financial loss increases, it increases those 
needing long term aid, at the expense of those needing short term aid. Number of 
people killed indicates the severity of the disaster whereby people being in danger 
of losing lives - increasing those in need of short term aid at the expense of long 
term aid. Increase in the number of people killed and financial loss obviously 
indicates a higher level of severity of disaster, whereas a higher average income 
points towards a lower severity, as would the number of people affected (higher 
the scale, lower the severity). Having higher income will result in the country 
receiving less long term aid, so that it requires the agency to give it more short 
term aid to save its victims. It is straight forward to notice from (16) to (19) how `aYbYNLXLYc 1 follows. 
Proposition 1 :   (L) d&(de > 0, d&(dT < 0, d&(d+ < 0, d&(d > 0 ;  (LL) d&Dde > 0, d&DdT > 0, d&Dd+ >0, d&Dd < 0 ;  (LLL) dfde < 0, dfdT > 0, dfd+ < 0, dfd > 0.  
2.1.1. Determinants of Long-Term Humanitarian Aid 
We start developing the predictions of the theory in relation to the theoretical 
constructs of the model. Notice from (12) that the optimal fraction of property loss 
that is restored, [ depends solely on (i) the severity of the disaster; (ii) the degree 
of corruption in the country in which the disaster has occurred; (iii) the level of per 
capita GDP in the country in which the disaster has occurred. It is independent of 
the long-term scale of the disaster. 
Consider first the issue of how likely it is that no long term aid will be given - so [ = 0. According to (12) this will happen if 
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 ≥ g", h i,"-1 −  j.                                                                                                                  (20) 
This shows that it is more likely that no long term aid will be given when the 
severity of the disaster is lower and at higher levels of income and corruption of 
the country. 
Next, consider the possibility that [ = 1 so that the financial loss that is suffered 
due to the disaster is fully restored. From (13) we see that this will happen if 
 ≤ g", k Z1 − 	l.                                                                                                                      (21) 
Thus, it is more likely that the financial loss is fully restored by the aid agency, the 
poorer and lesser corrupt the country in which the disaster occurs. However this 
condition does not depend on the severity of the disaster. 
Whenever long term aid is given, partially restoring the financial loss, 0 < [ < 1, 
then it follows from (12) and (13) that [ will be a strictly decreasing function of 
the levels of corruption and per capita GDP of the country in which the disaster 
occurs; and a strictly increasing function of the severity of the disaster. It follows 
from the above discussion that the total amount of long-term humanitarian aid 
decided by the aid agency is as given in (22). 
m =
no
oo
p
oo
oq
1 − 	 4g", k Z1 − 	l − (1 − )7
0 L  ≥ g", h i,"-1 −  j
 L g", k Z1 − 	l <  < g", h
i,"-1 −  j
1 − 	   L  ≤ g", k Z1 − 	l ro
oo
s
oo
ot
   (22) 
The amount of long-term humanitarian aid depends on four factors: the scale of 
the disaster, ; the severity of the disaster, ; the level of corruption, 	 and the 
GDP per capita, . It is straightforward to see that m is directly proportional to  
and that it is also increasing in . In the case of , it is strictly increasing when 
income is below g", 5 i,"-6 but strictly decreasing when income is above this level. 
So, the aid agency tends to focus aid on poorer countries, leaving richer ones to 
repair the consequences of the disaster from their own resources. 
The impact of corruption is less clear cut. There is a direct effect through which aid 
increases in the level of corruption to benefit the victims, but there is also an 
indirect effect whereby the greater the corruption the smaller the fraction of 
damage restored, leading to the prediction that, if the level of corruption is 
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sufficiently high no aid will be given. In what follows we will use the specific 
functional form that we introduced earlier, ′() = "#. In which case, 
g", k Z1 − 	l = u(1 − 	)vw                                                                                                       (23) 
where u = Zvw. Substituting (23) into (22) we get the following: 
m =
noo
op
ooo
q
1 − 	 xu(1 − 	)vw − (1 − )y
0 L  ≥ u(1 − 	)vw1 − 
 L u(1 − 	)vw <  < u(1 − 	)vw1 − 
1 − 	   L  ≤ u(1 − 	)vw roo
os
ooo
t
                  (24) 
How long-term aid changes with corruption is shown by (25). 
zmz	 = − (1 − 	){ |u (1 − $)(1 − 	)
vw$ + (1 − )}                                                     (25) 
It is clear that if ε ≤ 1 , then dm(d- < 0 - i.e. when the aid agency's inequality 
aversion is low, long-term aid is a decreasing function of corruption. What about 
the outcome when $ > 1? We can re-write (25) as follows. 
zmz	 = − (1 − 	){ 1 − y(1 − σ)εμ(1 − ε) 
# − χ                                                                    (26) 
Therefore 
dm(d- ≷0 L 	 ≶ x1 − 5(,"f)(,") 6#y. When $ > 1, then x1 − 5(,"f)(,") 6#y > 1. Since 	 ≤ 1, we can only have a situation where 	 < x1 − 5(,"f)(,") 6#y. So we can conclude 
that if $ > 1, dm(d- > 0 - i.e. when inequality aversion is sufficiently high, long-term aid 
is an increasing function of corruption.  
Proposition 2 summarises the above analysis about how long term aid is affected. 
Proposition 2: Long-term humanitarian aid is  
(i) an increasing function of the scale and severity of the disaster; 
(ii) not affected by per-capita GDP for both very poor and very rich 
countries, for other countries, an inverse U-shaped function of per-
capita GDP;  
(iii) a decreasing function of the level of corruption if the aid agency is not 
too inequality averse, $ ≤ 1;  
(iv) an increasing function of the level of corruption if the aid agency is 
sufficiently inequality averse, $ > 1. 
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Now we move on to relate long-term humanitarian aid to factors that are 
observable, namely number of people killed, number of people who are affected 
and financial loss. We can re-write (22) as follows, by substituting out (1) and (16): 
m =
no
op
oo
q
 − |^ + 1 + T+ } x − u(1 − 	)
vwy
0 L  ≥ u(1 − 	)vw1 − 
 L u(1 − 	)vw <  < u(1 − 	)vw1 − 
1 − 	   L  ≤ u(1 − 	)vw ro
os
oo
t
                      (27) 
Using (27) and the predictions of Proposition 1 regarding the scale and severity of 
the long term aid requirement, we make the following analysis. It is straight 
forward to see that 
m(e < 0 when u(1 − 	)vw <  < (,"-)vw,"* . This could be because the 
increase in the total scale indicates a reduction in the severity of the disaster with 
less people killed. It is also worth drawing attention to the fact that when 
 ≥ (,"-)vw,"* , m will fully restore what is lost and is not dependent on ^. Similarly, 
when  ≤ u(1 − 	)vw, there will be no short term aid, and therefore will not be 
influenced by ^. 
When more people are killed, the affected country is given more long term aid, 
m = − x − u(1 − 	)
vwy 51 − e+ 651 + T+ 6{ > 0 <OJNO 
^ > 1.                                           (28) 
When financial loss increases, there is a positive direct impact on long term aid, 
which however, is counteracted by a negative indirect effect working via the impact 
of financial loss on the scale of the disaster. Therefore the effect is ambiguous. 
m = 1 −  x − :(1 − 	)
vwy (^ + )
51 + T+ 6{ { ≷ 0.                                                                 (29) 
Proposition 3 summarises how long term aid is affected by the observable features 
of the disaster. 
Proposition 3: Long-term humanitarian aid is a decreasing function of the number 
of people affected and an increasing function of the number of people killed, while 
the impact of financial loss on long-term humanitarian aid is ambiguous. 
2.1.2. Determinants of Short-Term Humanitarian Aid 
Similar to the case of long-term aid, we begin by deriving predictions in terms of 
the constructs of the theory -- particularly the scale and severity of the disaster -- 
and then turn to the predictions in terms of observables. If we consider first the 
Geethanjali SELVARETNAM, Kannika THAMPANISHVONG & David ULPH 
 
 
Page |14                                                                            EJBE 2014, 7 (14) 
issue of how likely it is that no short term aid will be given - so [/ = 0 - then we 
see from (11) that the greater the degree of corruption, the larger the right hand 
side of the equation and so the less likely that short-term aid be given. Turning to 
the impact of the severity of the disaster we see that this has two effects which go 
in opposite directions. The greater the severity of the disaster, the higher the 
marginal cost of saving a life and so the larger is the right hand side of (11), which 
means the more likely it is that no aid will be given. However, the greater the 
severity of the disaster the higher might be the perceived benefit of trying to save a 
life and so the less likely it is that no aid will be given. 
In those cases where immediate relief is given - [/ > 0 - then the same arguments 
indicate that [/ will be a strictly decreasing function of the degree of corruption 
but can be either an increasing or decreasing function of the scale of the disaster 
depending on which of the two effects identified above is greater. 
Turning to the total amount of short-term aid given to a country struck by the 
disaster, we see from (8) that this is: 
m/ = /  [/(, 	), R(1 − 	) .                                                                                             (30) 
So the amount of short-term humanitarian aid depends on just three factors: the 
scale of the disaster, /; the severity of the disaster,  and level of corruption, 	. 
Total short-term humanitarian aid is directly proportional to the scale of the 
disaster, similar to long-term aid. 
In relation to both the severity of the disaster and the level of corruption, there are 
two opposing effects. The direct effect implies that an increase in the severity of 
the disaster means that more aid has to be given to achieve any given survival 
fraction, while an increase in the level of corruption means that more has to be 
spent in any given country to ensure that a given amount of aid reaches the 
victims. However there is also the indirect effect that an increase in both severity 
and corruption reduces the optimal survival fraction which reduces the amount of 
aid that will be given. 
At this level of generality it is difficult to say much about which of these two effects 
dominates. To make some progress, we consider the functional forms for (, ) 
and <( /) that we introduced in (4) and (6) respectively and substitute them into 
(11): 
             m/ = /αβ(1 − χ) Max 0, |B(1 − χ)σ(1 − σ),"λα 
v − 1} .                            (31) 
Now consider the impact of the severity of the disaster on short-term aid. If A > 0, 
there will be no short term aid given if the disaster is sufficiently mild (less severe) 
and if B < 1, then there will also be no short-term aid given if the disaster is 
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extremely severe. If B > 1, then a positive amount of short-term aid will certainly 
be given if the disaster is severe and, if positive, the amount of short-term aid will 
be a strictly increasing function of the severity of disaster. More specifically, 
zm/zσ = | /α(1 + β)(1 − χ) vv k
=λl σ(v)(v))v (1 − σ)v (¡)v } (γ + σδ − γσ − σ).         (32) 
From (32) we can see that the value inside the square brackets is positive, so 
dmDdf  ≷ 0 if σ ≶ >,¤>"? , which suggests an inverse U-shaped function. 
Turning now to the impact of corruption on short-term aid, we can see from the 
term within the square brackets in (31) that if the degree of corruption is 
sufficiently large, then no short-term aid will be given. However if the degree of 
corruption is low and the amount of short-term aid is high then 
m/ ≈ &D¦§(,"¨) vv 5©f(,"f)v ª¦ 6
v
. Thus, short-term aid will be a strictly increasing 
function of the degree of corruption. Taken together, this suggests an inverse U-
shaped relation between short-term humanitarian aid and the degree of 
corruption. Finally we observe that short-term aid is not influenced by . 
Proposition 4 summarises the above discussion. 
Proposition 4:  Short-term humanitarian aid is an increasing function of the scale of 
the disaster; may either be a strictly increasing or an inverse U-shaped function of 
the severity of the disaster and an inverse U-shaped function of corruption. Short 
term aid is not affected by the per capita GDP. 
Next we turn to the predictions in terms of what can be observed, number of 
people killed, ; number of people affected, ^ and the amount of financial loss, . 
Proposition 1 and Proposition 4 are used to conduct this analysis. We see that 
short-term humanitarian aid is certainly an increasing function of the severity of 
the disaster over an initial range of severity. To the extent that short-term 
humanitarian aid is an increasing function of the severity of the disaster (at least 
over a range of values of severity), we can come to the following conclusions, 
which is summarised in Proposition 5. 
When  increases, it will increase /,which in turn increases m/; while it increases , which will increases m/. Therefore, an increase in the number of people killed 
will increase the amount of immediate relief that the affected country attracts. As 
far as the total number of people affected and the financial loss are concerned, 
there are opposing effects. When ^ increases, it will increase /,which in turn 
increases m/ while it decreases , which will decreases m/. So the effect is 
ambiguous. Likewise, when  increases, it will decrease /, which in turn decreases m/ while it increases , which will increase m/, causing the effect to be ambiguous. 
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Proposition 5: So long as the short-term humanitarian aid is an increasing function 
of the severity of the disaster, short-term aid is an increasing function of the 
number of people killed, while the effects of the number affected and financial loss 
are ambiguous. 
3. Empirical Analysis 
In this section we investigate whether the disaster-related factors and country-
specific characteristics influence the amount of humanitarian aid - immediate and 
long-term relief - disbursed by the donors. The former refers to the type of 
disaster, scale and severity of disaster, while the latter is related to the level of 
development, corruption and the size of the country. The scale and severity of the 
disaster cannot be directly observed. We use variables that can be observed, 
detailed description of which follows in sub section 3.1. 
 Our empirical investigation seeks answers to questions such as the following. Is the 
amount of disaster relief received by the affected countries related to the scale of 
financial damage caused by the natural disaster? Do the donors tend to cluster the 
disaster relief where it will have the largest impact on the victims in terms of saving 
lives and reducing suffering? Do resource-poor countries receive more disaster 
relief? Does the level of corruption in the affected countries influence donors' aid 
disbursement? Does the type of disaster (earthquake, flood etc.) have an effect on 
the aid? Do these relationships differ between immediate relief and long-term 
humanitarian aid? For instance, does higher financial loss attract higher long term 
aid because of the need for reconstruction and number of people killed attract 
higher short term aid because it indicates the severity of the disaster in claiming 
lives. 
3.1. Description and Sources of Data 
We use the data on the effects of 5394 natural disasters that occurred during 1995 
- 2008 in 186 countries and the humanitarian aid that was received towards these 
disasters. The impact of each disaster is different from another. Some disasters 
would have killed more people, but the financial loss could be less, and vice versa. 
There are disasters which have resulted in no reported deaths whereas there are 
others with no reported financial loss. Disasters do not occur in all countries in all 
the years, hence the panel is unbalanced. 
Dependent variable: The dependent variable is the humanitarian aid that was 
received by the affected country as a response to the disasters, distinguishing 
between the short term disaster relief to enable survival and long term aid to assist 
the rebuilding and rehabilitating of victims.  
There are several sources of data for humanitarian aid which are available. The two 
commonly known database include the Creditor Reporting System (CRS) 
maintained by the OECD and the Financial Tracking Service (FTS) maintained by the 
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UN. The CRS aid activity database collects information on official development 
assistance and other official flows to developing countries.  
Another humanitarian aid database, the Project-Level Aid (PLAID), was developed 
by William and Mary University and Brigham Young University, which we have used 
for this analysis. The humanitarian aid data contained in this database comes from 
a number of sources, including the OECD's CRS, annual reports and project 
documents published by donors, web-accessible databases and project documents, 
spread sheets and data exports obtained directly from donor agencies. The 
majority of aid activities in this database are drawn from the OECD's CRS. For 
donors who are not members of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of 
the OECD or those who do not report to the OECD CRS, data were gathered 
through many different channels.  
Few versions of the PLAID data existed, but the version which we used in our 
empirical analysis was the PLAID beta 1.9.2 which can be found on http://www. 
AidData.org. The coverage of this PLAID data set includes information on each 
individual project committed by both bilateral and multilateral aid donors. It also 
provides detailed coding for a variety of additional factors which makes it possible 
for us to obtain data on disaster relief given for emergencies caused only by natural 
disasters.  
The descriptive information given for each entry in PLAID beta 1.9.2 enabled us to 
match the disaster relief with the specific disaster event. There are some cases 
where we could not match them perfectly because the aid could match more than 
one disaster which took place in that country and year. For the panel data analysis 
that we carry out, we only need the aid to be matched with the type of disaster, 
country and year the disaster took place as well as the damage it caused. 
First of all, we find out the total humanitarian aid that is received towards each 
disaster. Then we went on to categorise it into two types: short-term and long-
term disaster reliefs, based on the long descriptions provided by the database. The 
broad criteria used in our classification are as follows. The short-term disaster relief 
refers to the immediate assistance offered to the victims of natural disasters to 
ensure their survival, usually taking the form of distributions of food, water, 
medical supplies, and provision of temporary shelters etc., while the long-term 
disaster relief refers to the donors' supports in the reconstruction and 
rehabilitation programmes that take place in the countries affected by the natural 
disaster. It is important to highlight that the long-term disaster relief does not 
include investment in disaster mitigation nor does it include investment in disaster 
prevention and preparedness programmes. 
According to the reported data that we use for this investigation, some disasters 
have attracted no humanitarian aid at all whereas others have attracted short term 
or long term aid, while there are some which have attracted both types. The 
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objective of our empirical analysis is to find out what factors drive these 
differences. 
Explanatory Variables: Data on the occurrences of natural disasters, the type of 
disaster and the damages caused by them are obtained from the Emergency Events 
Database (EM-DAT), maintained by the Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of 
Disasters (CRED) at the University of Louvain. The three explanatory variables that 
capture the damage caused by the disaster are the number of people killed, 
number of people affected (this includes those who are homeless, injured and 
those badly affected, in need of immediate relief) and the amount of financial loss. 
The type of disaster is included in the analysis as a dummy variable which could be 
one of earthquake, flood, drought, epidemic, landslide or avalanche, wildfires, 
volcano, storm, extreme temperature and tsunami. The URL for this database is 
http://www.emdat.be/. 
The EM-DAT database provides updated information about the natural disasters 
that took place around the world and the consequences brought by them. For a 
disaster to be included in the EM-DAT database, it should meet at least one of the 
following criteria: at least ten people killed, at least hundred people affected, a 
state of emergency is called or international assistance is called for. The number of 
people killed refers to those who died as a direct consequence of the disaster (even 
though it includes those who are presumed dead, the figure is adjusted as and 
when the correct information is received). The financial loss is an estimate of the 
value of the assets that the country had lost due to a given disaster. When it comes 
to the total number of people affected, it is worth mentioning that the extent of 
the injuries to those who are injured, and the extent of damage to properties and 
houses of those who became homeless are not known. For the purpose of 
comparing with the theoretical framework, we do not know whether the people 
affected are in need of immediate relief or long term aid. 
Other than these disaster related explanatory variables and the dummy variables 
for the type of disaster, we also have three variables that capture the socio 
economic characteristics of the affected country. These are the corruption 
perception index (CPI), GDP per capita, and the total population of the country. The 
CPI, as the term suggests, captures the level of corruption. The CPI index, which is 
between 0 and 10, assesses each country's perceived levels of corruption as 
determined by expert assessments and opinion surveys. The higher is the CPI, the 
less corrupt is the country. This data is publicly available at 
http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi. The GDP per 
capita (in current USD) indicates the average income of an individual in the country. 
The population variable does not feature in our theoretical model. We decided to 
control for it to see whether the size of the country has any influence on the 
donors. Data on GDP per capita and population size are made available by the 
United Nations Statistics Division. The URL for this database is 
http://unstats.un.org/unsd/snaama/dnllist.asp. 
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Table 1 gives the information according to the data we use for our analysis, about 
the number of disasters, the extent of damage that is caused by the disasters, 
captured by the number of people killed, affected and the amount of financial loss 
resulted from different types of disasters that occurred. Some people could be 
affected more than once because of disasters in the same region. 
Table 1: Natural Disasters and Consequences during 1995 - 2008. 
Type 
Number of 
disasters 
Number of 
people killed 
Number of 
people affected 
Financial loss 
(million USD) 
Earthquake 359 503,659 185,795,103 424219.99 
Flood 1,947 127,075 8,096,765,200 272634.90 
Drought 250 6,406 1,110,003,220 41581.30 
Epidemic 799 96,484 7,245,171 1.70 
Landslide/Avalanche 244 12,017 3,611,713 5566.83 
Wildfires 182 924 2,003,512,730 21007.31 
Volcano 80 303 1,556,926 203.10 
Storm 1,280 121,737 1,760,874,330 660268.69 
Extreme temperature 232 94,545 84,404,594 45142.56 
Tsunami 21 593,542 8,746,597 20004.40 
3.2. Empirical methodology 
We conducted a panel data analysis to find out the determinants of disaster relief. 
We considered the fact that the humanitarian aid that is received can never be 
negative. The regression model is described in equation (33). The subscript L 
denotes the 186 different countries and the subscript X = 1995, . . . ,2008 denotes 
the year. The dependent variable is the humanitarian aid given by «¬2 (J =­, , ®) where «¬ /, «¬ and «¬¯ refer to the short-term disaster relief, long-term 
disaster and total disaster relief, respectively. 
Table 2: Summary Statistics of Variables 
Variable Mean Standard deviation Minimum Maximum e (MLLYc $) 7.20  61.98    0 1215.92 / (MLLYc $) 1.19  12.02    0 261.75  (MLLYc $) 6.00  55.96     0 1208.66 `YbJXLYc (MLLYc)  49.40 154.53 0.03  1330.05 ±bJb ($) 6,193.60 10,550.18 63.00 65566.00 ²`³ 3.68    1.98         0.4 10.00 ´LcYNN (million) 912.67 9,338.976 0 284,060.30 LO (000) 0.95     10.96 0 332.31 ^OXO(000) 14,140.59 409,063.8 0 1.64e+07 
The explanatory variables, ´LcYNN, LO, ^OXO denote the amount of financial 
loss, number of peopled killed and the number of people affected by natural 
disasters by respectively. The variables, `YbJXLYc, ±bJb and ²`³ denote the 
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number of population, GDP per capita and the corruption perception index of the 
recipient country respectively. 
There could be more than one disaster in one country in a particular year which 
could also determine the amount of aid that is received. The number of disasters 
that occurred in a particular year is captured by the variable, µLNJNXOaN. The rest of 
the variables are dummy variables, which equal to one if that particular type of 
disaster occurred at least once in that country in that year and zero otherwise. 
The dependent variable is the amount of humanitarian aid, which cannot be 
negative. If we use a panel data model without restrictions, the estimates will be 
inconsistent with the slopes being downward biased and the intercept being 
upward biased. Taking into account that ¶ ≥ 0: we estimate ·(¶∗/K) =IJK(0, º»). A tobit model with the lowest level of the dependent variable being 
zero, would be consistent because it will give maximum likelihood estimates.
3
 Since 
fixed effects Tobit models cannot be regressed, we have used dummy variables for 
countries, »¼½, so that country-specific effects are controlled for. We consider this 
model to be the most suitable for this analysis even though the estimates may not 
be unbiased. Three separate regressions were run to find out how these three 
dependent variables («¬ /, «¬ and «¬¯) are influenced by the explanatory 
variables. We have also used the Tobit random effects model without controlling 
for the countries in order to check the effect of CPI because it does not vary within 
countries too much. 
«¬2 = IJK
no
oo
p
oo
oq
0,
¾
¿¿
¿¿
¿¿
À :Á
 +  :,´LcYNN«¬ + :{LO«¬ + :Â^OXO«¬ +
:Ã`YbJXLYc«¬ + :Ä±bJb«¬ + :Å²`³«¬ + :ÆµLNJNXOaN«¬ +
:Ç´YY«¬ + :È·JaXℎÉJO«¬ + :,Á®NcJML«¬ + :,,µaYÊℎX«¬ +
:,{ËYJcY«¬ + :,Â^]JJcℎ«¬ + :,Ã·KXaOMO«¬ + :,Ä·bLOML«¬ +
:,Å­XYaM«¬ + :,ÆLLaON«¬ + :²« + «¬ Ì
ÍÍ
ÍÍ
ÍÍ
Î
ro
oo
s
oo
ot
(33). 
 
3.3. Empirical Results 
In this subsection, the results of the panel data regression using the Tobit model 
are presented. Countries are controlled for, but are not presented because there 
are too many. Table 3, Table 4 and Table 5 contain the results from our empirical 
investigation of the determinants of total humanitarian aid, short term disaster 
relief and long term disaster relief respectively. The standard errors are given 
within parentheses and *, ** and *** indicate that the variable are statistically 
significant at 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent respectively.  
                                                           
3
 It assumes that ¶∗/K~YaMJ(K:, N²) Jc N² = ]Ja(¶∗/K) and does not depend on K. 
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The coefficients indicate the change in humanitarian aid weighted by the 
probability of attracting positive amount of aid. The «¬2 and ´LcYNN are in millions 
of US dollars; LO and ^OXO are in thousands; ±bJb is in current US dollars 
and ²`³ is given as an index which is between zero and ten where lower the value, 
higher the level of corruption. 
        Table 3: Determinants of Total Disaster Relief ¯ I II `YbJXLYc 0.68838∗ (0.36962) 0.7881225∗∗ (0.3586174) ±bJb 0.000246∗ (0.00371)  ²`³ −26.04295∗∗ (11.24409) −27.90781∗∗ (11.11835) ´LcYNN 0.0016027∗∗∗ (0.0016027) 0.0014014∗∗∗ (0.0005016) LO 4.194763∗∗∗ (0.2719686) 4.357838∗∗∗ (0.2389704) ^OXO 0.00003466∗∗∗ (0.00000601) 0.0000336∗∗∗ (0.0000336) µLNJNXOaN 6.379708∗∗∗ (2.012796) 6.066022∗∗∗ (1.743004) ´YY 8.109651 (11.06593)  ·JaXℎÉJO 39.78723∗∗∗ (39.78723) 40.01094∗∗∗ (13.2313) ®NcJML 43.33861 (31.80823)  µaYÊℎX 39.28206∗∗∗ (10.88) 39.63541∗∗∗ (39.63541) ËYJcY −9.358858 (2.47074)  ^]JJcℎ −1.607068 (13.80701)  ·KXaOMOXOMb −88.87203∗∗∗ (19.46213) −90.57443∗∗∗ (19.27466) ·bLOML −13.28513 (6.631624)  ­XYaM 8.33046 (11.62142)  LLaON −17.95567  (20.34714)  
In all three regressions, the number killed and financial loss are highly significant 
(total and long term aid at 1%, while short term aid is at 5% significance level), 
suggesting that an increase in the number of people killed by the disaster and an 
increase in the amount of financial loss will result in an increase in the probability 
of receiving disaster relief and of the expected amount. Though people who are 
dead cannot benefit from the aid, number killed is an indicator of the severity of 
the disaster and assistance from the donors to minimise further suffering and 
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restore the damage. It also could mean that many bread winners of families being 
dead, requiring financial assistance for the affected families in the long run. 
The total aid and long term aid significantly increases (at 1%) with the number of 
people affected by the disasters, while its effect on short term aid was not 
significant. Recall that the number of people affected by natural disaster includes 
those who became homeless, injured and affected severely and in need of 
immediate assistance. However, according to our investigation, donors perceive 
this indicator to require long term assistance. 
Table 4: Determinants of Short Term Disaster Relief / I II `YbJXLYc 0.4436216∗∗∗ (0.1324854) 0.4002443∗∗∗ (0.1245782) ±bJb 0.0004843 (0.0015404)  ²`³ −7.648553∗∗  (3.794085) −7.62367∗∗ (3.794085) ´LcYNN 0.0002894∗∗ (0.0001227) 0.0002818∗∗ (0.0001186) LO 0.2735108∗∗∗ (0.0809464) 0.2887515∗∗∗ (0.0789501) ^OXO 0.00000199 (0.00000188)  µLNJNXOaN 1.001273∗∗ (0.6518507) 1.170689∗∗ (0.5665288) ´YY 8.559362∗∗ (3.699207) 7.996562∗∗ (3.560856) ·JaXℎÉJO 14.32392∗∗∗ (4.43326) 13.61853∗∗∗ (4.43326) ®NcJML 22.34297∗∗ (10.23278) 20.94611∗∗ (10.11857) µaYÊℎX 15.00415∗∗∗ (3.581501) 14.52061∗∗∗ (3.493365) ËYJcY 1.757915 (6.768336)  ^]JJcℎ 4.593298 (4.504904)  ·KXaOMOXOMb −15.82023∗∗∗ (6.362575) −16.73173∗∗∗ (6.32152) ·bLOML 0.3275552 (3.439476)  ­XYaM 2.472262 (3.907754)  LLaON 2.929514  (6.631624)  
 
The level of development captured by the GDP per capita was found be significant 
in determining either the short term or long term aid (total aid was significant at 
10% level, indicating that the donors do not place much emphasis on the level of 
Saving and Re-building Lives: Determinants of Short-term and Long-term Disaster Relief 
 
       
EJBE 2014, 7 (14)                                                                                                 Page | 23 
development of the affected country when considering the allocation of 
humanitarian aid. Population level significantly increases total aid (at 10%) and 
short term aid (at 1%), which indicates that populated countries benefit more 
compared to smaller countries. 
It is interesting to note that the level of corruption is significant at 5% level for 
total, long-term and short-term humanitarian aid, indicating that higher corruption 
attracts higher amount of aid. When it comes to humanitarian aid, the donors are 
so concerned about the victims that they give more aid to compensate for what 
might be leaked out due to corruption. The results of the random effects panel 
regression are presented in the Appendix. This model which does not control for 
the different countries, also confirm these results (Table A1-3). 
Table 5: Determinants of Long Term Disaster Relief  I II `YbJXLYc −0.1306048  (0.5025238)  ±bJb −0.0023893  (0.005673)  ²`³ −39.3695∗∗  (17.31166) −42.38721∗∗∗  (17.13034) ´LcYNN 0.0008357∗∗∗  (0.0008357 0.0027407∗∗∗ (0.0007988) LO 4.198412∗∗∗  (0.3499186) 4.239634∗∗∗  (0.3427376) ^OXO 0.0000461∗∗∗  (0.00000835) 0.0000436∗∗∗ (0.00000804) µLNJNXOaN 11.0821∗∗∗  (3.299867) 10.783232∗∗∗  (3.129856) ´YY −40.39658∗∗  (17.8999) −39.2034∗∗  (17.50219) ·JaXℎÉJO 53.58815∗∗∗  (20.55906) 56.55222∗∗∗  (20.08626) ®NcJML 94.94196∗∗  (44.96548) 97.19509∗∗  (44.96548) µaYÊℎX 32.49247∗∗∗  (17.75344) 35.16121∗∗  (17.45005) ËYJcY −11.48524  (32.82165)  ^]JJcℎ −16.9481  (22.42129)  ·KXaOMOXOMb −134.1715∗∗∗  (30.89421) −132.288∗∗∗   (30.89421) ·bLOML −37.86449∗∗  (17.629) −37.17531∗∗  (17.3659) ­XYaM 13.41685  (18.34191)  LLaON −39.7657   (33.59188)  
The number of disasters (given by the variable, µLNJNXOaN) is a significant 
determinant in all three regressions. The more a country is prone to being hit by 
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disasters, the more aid it attracts: short term aid (5% level of significance), long 
term aid (1% level of significance) and total aid (1% level of significance).  
Short term aid is significantly increased because of flood, tsunami (at 5%), 
earthquake and drought (at 1%). Donors recognise that these types of disasters 
would require more immediate assistance. It also could be because these disasters 
attract more publicity about the hardship suffered by the victims. Long term aid 
statistically increases with earthquake, drought (at 1%) and tsunami (at 5%). These 
disasters would damage buildings and other assets, which require long term 
assistance to rebuild. 
Some types of disasters - avalanches, volcanos, storm, extreme temperature and 
wildfires – do not attract as much humanitarian aid when compared to other types 
which cause damage of similar scale and severity. Extreme temperature results in 
significantly lower total, short term and long term aid (at 1%). Surprisingly, long 
term aid is negatively influenced by floods (at 5%). 
4. Conclusion 
We have analysed the factors that influence the amount of humanitarian aid 
received by countries which are struck by natural disasters, drawing a distinction 
between the amount of humanitarian aid received as immediate relief and what is 
received as long term humanitarian aid. The theoretical model shows how the 
humanitarian aid that is given depends on the scale and severity of the disaster 
which are not observable as well as factors that are observable - disaster-specific 
variables (number of people killed, affected and financial loss) and country-specific 
variables (GDP per capita and corruption). The predictions of the theoretical model 
are able to explain the empirical results that followed. 
Our empirical results show that both the number of people killed and financial loss 
which indicate the severity of a disaster are statistically significant, while the 
number of people affected is significant only for the long term aid. If possible, it 
might be worth trying to break this down into long term and short term needs of 
those affected. Level of development is not statistically significant in determining 
the level of humanitarian aid. Corruption significantly increases humanitarian aid of 
either type, indicating the high inequality aversion of the donors, who care for the 
victims to such an extent. 
Research about humanitarian aid can be taken forward in various ways. In 
particular, the factors affecting disaster relief given towards different types of 
mitigation, which includes the damage caused by different types of natural 
disasters, is worth studying. This problem can be analysed both from the donor's 
and the recipient's perspective. It is also worthwhile investigating the types of 
mitigation efforts that are effective, so that such projects could be promoted and 
financed. 
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Appendix  
The results of the random effects model of the panel data regression, which are the 
same for pooled regression, are given below along with the ones for 'fixed effects' 
for comparison. Tables A1, A2 and A3 give the results for total HA, long-term HA 
and short-term HA respectively. The results confirm the effect of ²`³, which was 
the main concern when controlling for the countries. The other difference is that 
the in the random effects model indicate that the probability and the amount of 
humanitarian aid will decrease if ±bJb is higher. We can rely more on the model 
which controls for other country-specific effects.  
Table A1: Determinants of Total Disaster Relief 
    ^¯ Pooled/ Random Effect 'Fixed Effect' 
I II I II 
 `YbJXLYc −0.0418596  (0.0371189)  0.68838∗  (0.36962) 0.7881225∗∗  (0.3586174) 
 ±bJb −0.0044529∗∗∗ (0.0012836) −0.0043188∗∗∗ (0.0012682) 0.000246∗ (0.00371)  
  ²`³ −9.293034∗∗ (4.676868) −9.759294∗∗ (4.686084) −26.042955∗∗ (11.24409) −27.90781∗∗ (11.11835) 
   ´LcYNN 0.0012905∗∗∗      (0.000336) 0.0012433∗∗∗ (0.0003322) 0.0016027∗∗∗ (0.000572) 0.0014014∗∗∗ (0.0005016) 
 LO 4.107991∗∗∗ (0.2621469) 4.10641∗∗∗ (0.2594929) 4.194763∗∗∗ (0.2719686) 4.357838∗∗∗ (0.2389704) 
 ^OXO 0.0000307∗∗∗ (0.00000633) 0.0000296∗∗∗ (0.00000619) 0.0000346∗∗∗ (0.00000601) 0.0000336∗∗∗ (0.00000584) 
 µLNJNXOaN 5.484761∗∗∗ (1.83201) 5.091394∗∗∗ (1.405173) 6.379708∗∗∗ (2.012796) 6.066022∗∗∗ (1.743004) 
 ´YY 10.64793 (9.769138)  8.109651 (11.06593)  
 ·JaXℎÉJO 35.66524∗∗∗ (12.28524) 34.11647∗∗∗ (12.19996) 39.78723∗∗∗ (13.62136) 40.01094∗∗∗ (13.2313) 
 ®NcJML 57.01677∗ (31.15458) 54.52965∗ (30.88297) 43.33861 (31.80823)  
 µaYÊℎX 36.84515∗∗∗ (10.55835) 35.49165∗∗∗ (10.25705) 39.28206∗∗∗ (10.88) 39.63541∗∗∗ (10.45472) 
 ËYJcY −3.083733 (19.45383)  −9.358858 (2.47074)  
 ^]JJcℎ −2.279674 (13.46577)  −1.607068 (13.80701)  
 ·KXaOMOXOMb −66.63952∗∗∗ (17.63648) −68.48246∗∗∗ (17.4827) −88.87203∗∗∗ (19.46213) −90.57443∗∗∗  (19.27466) 
 ·bLOML −17.9193∗ (9.675328) −18.70195∗∗ (9.382569) −13.28513  (10.52071)  
 ­XYaM 26.57633∗∗∗ (10.12072)) 24.125∗∗ (9.693189) 8.33046 (11.62142)  
 LLaON −39.88297 ∗∗ (19.7276) −39.61884 ∗∗ (19.58719) −17.95567 (20.34714)  
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Table A2: Determinants of long term disaster relief 
    ^ Pooled/ Random Effect 'Fixed Effect' 
I II I II 
 `YbJXLYc −0.0750245  (0.0608813)  −0.1306048  (0.5025238)  
 ±bJb −0.0041137∗∗ (0.0018886) −0.0036676∗∗ (0.0018333) −0.0023893 (0.005673)  
  ²`³ −16.38574∗∗ (7.866695) −16.74401∗∗ (7.820975) −39.3695∗∗ (17.31166) −42.38721∗∗∗ (17.13034) 
   ´LcYNN 0.0018343∗∗∗ (0.0004756) 0.0017485∗∗∗ (0.0004711) 0.0028448∗∗∗ (0.0008357) 0.0027407∗∗∗ (0.0007988) 
 LO 3.96316∗∗∗ (0.3617722) 3.913192∗∗∗ (0.3592756) 4.198412∗∗∗ (0.3499186) 4.239634∗∗∗ (0.3427376) 
 ^OXO 0.0000398∗∗∗ (2.996452) 0.0000363∗∗∗ (2.315031) 0.0000461∗∗∗ (0.00000835) 0.0000436∗∗∗ (0.00000804) 
 µLNJNXOaN 10.31231∗∗∗ (3.299867) 6.526464∗∗∗ (3.299867) 11.0821∗∗∗ (3.299867) 10.783232∗∗∗ (3.129856) 
 ´YY −25.91719 (16.68052)  −40.39658∗∗ (17.8999) −39.2034∗∗ (17.50219) 
 ·JaXℎÉJO 51.15077∗∗∗ (19.8643) 53.99151∗∗∗ (19.85456) 53.58815∗∗∗ (20.55906) 56.55222∗∗∗ (20.08626) 
 ®NcJML 97.29056∗∗ (45.90315) 107.7914∗∗ (45.61624) 94.94196∗∗ (44.96548) 97.19509∗∗ (44.96548) 
 µaYÊℎX 29.97084∗ (17.94014) 35.92513∗∗ (17.78109) 32.49247∗∗∗ (17.75344) 35.16121∗∗ (17.45005) 
 ËYJcY −6.729559 (32.84008)  −11.48524 (32.82165)  
 ^]JJcℎ −15.34827 (23.38077)  −16.9481 (22.42129)  
 ·KXaOMOXOMb −96.19339∗∗∗ (30.38778) −93.43714∗∗∗ (30.12581) −134.1715∗∗∗ (30.89421) −132.288∗∗∗ (30.57079) 
 ·bLOML −43.32823∗∗ (17.05657) −36.10109∗∗ (16.61151) −37.86449∗∗ (17.629) −37.17531∗∗ (17.3659) 
 ­XYaM 45.16899∗∗∗ (17.23061) 54.03149∗∗∗ (16.6043) 13.41685 (18.34191)  
 LLaON −66.38844∗∗  (35.34797) −59.22872∗∗  (34.83567) −39.7657  (33.59188)  
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Table A3: Determinants of Short Term Disaster Relief 
   ^/ Pooled/ Random Effect 'Fixed Effect' 
I II I II 
 `YbJXLYc −0.0069309  (0.0108734)  0.4436216 ∗∗∗ (0.1324854) 0.4002443 ∗∗∗ (0.1245782) 
 ±bJb −0.0019426∗∗ (0.0005198) −0.0019048∗∗∗ (0.0005039) −0.0004843 (0.0005039)  
  ²`³ −1.820946  (1.522106) −1.908272  (1.511675) −7.648553∗∗ (3.820505 −7.62367∗∗ (3.794085) 
   ´LcYNN 0.0003857∗∗∗ (0.0000109) 0.0003624∗∗∗ (0.0001065) 0.0002894∗∗ (0.0001227) 0.0002818∗∗ (0.0001186) 
 LO 0.2545535∗∗∗ (0.0813737) 0.263458∗∗∗ (0.0801282) 0.2735108∗∗∗ (0.0809464) 0.2887515∗∗∗ (0.0789501) 
 ^OXO 0.0000108   (0.00000195)  0.0000199  (0.00000188)  
 µLNJNXOaN 1.177205∗∗ (0.5880165) 0.941451∗∗ (0.4452636) 1.001273∗∗ (0.6518507) 1.170689∗∗ (0.5665288) 
 ´YY 7.430482∗∗∗ (3.12790) 7.884083∗∗∗ (3.040933) 8.559362∗∗ (3.699207) 7.996562∗∗ (3.560856) 
 ·JaXℎÉJO 9.346277∗∗ (3.910353) 9.720624∗∗ (3.910353) 14.32392∗∗∗ (4.533598) 13.61853∗∗∗ (4.43326) 
 ®NcJML 29.58473∗∗∗ (9.742156) 29.77207∗∗∗ (9.676018) 22.34297∗∗ (10.23278) 20.94611∗∗ (10.11857) 
 µaYÊℎX 13.58754∗∗∗ (3.362266) 13.64486∗∗∗ (3.302922) 15.00415∗∗∗ (3.581501) 14.52061∗∗∗ (3.493365) 
 ËYJcY 6.768336 (6.163206)  1.757915 (6.768336)  
 ^]JJcℎ 1.84092 (4.241369)  4.593298 (4.504904)  
 ·KXaOMOXOMb −13.1667∗∗ (5.397098) −13.74467∗∗∗ (5.354032) −15.82023∗∗∗ (6.362575) −16.73173∗∗∗ (6.32152) 
 ·bLOML −1.968907  (3.055019)  0.3275552  (3.439476)  
 ­XYaM 6.852578∗∗ (3.204247) 7.097234∗∗ (7.097234) 2.472262 (3.907754)  
 LLaON −7.586214  (6.139343)  2.929514  (6.631624)  
 
 
 
   
